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Abstract
We study the consequences of broader access to credit and capital markets on
household decisions over the number of children. A model of the net reproduction
rate is estimated on data from 78 countries over the period 1995{2010. Liquidity
constraints are approximated by private credit and household credit, while oppor-
tunities for nancial investment are measured by the domestic public debt. We use
the Index of Financial Liberalisation (Abiad et al., 2009) as one of the instruments
for the nancial variables. We nd that improved access to credit increases fertility
with an elasticity of around 30%, while the eect of the development of capital
markets is negative ( 10%). The regression model takes the role of social security
into account. Quantile regression shows that our results are robust to outliers and
parameter heterogeneity.
JEL Codes: D1, J13, G1.
Keywords: Fertility, Financial Market Development, Old-Age Security.
Corresponding author.
1 Introduction
Fertility behaviour and nancial development have seen dramatic changes in re-
cent decades, both showing distinctive patterns: as nancial development spreads
worldwide, enhancing the possibility of credit and intertemporal trade for house-
holds and rms, fertility shows a clear downward trend which is cause for concern,
especially in developed countries which will be facing decreasing populations in the
near future.
Do these two phenomena simply show a spurious temporal correlation or does
one cause the other? Financial development may be one of the driving forces that
change fertility behaviour. Raising children requires a signicant transfer of parents'
resources in the children's favour, which may be driven not only by altruism, but
also by the expectation that some resources will be returned during the parents'
old age: this exchange is not synchronous and requires coordination of individ-
ual actions that can be best achieved by means of specialised institutions. Since
the basic function of nancial markets is to facilitate intertemporal trade, making
current consumption less dependent on current income, better organised and di-
versied nancial markets would make such transfers easier and induce parents to
have more children. Nevertheless, the development of nancial markets reduces the
demand for children for the purpose of receiving old age support. The impact of
nancial development on fertility is therefore undetermined and should be assessed
empirically.
A glimpse at the gures involved can give an idea of the radical change that
has taken place. At the world level, the fertility rate, i.e., the average number of
children per woman over her lifetime, dropped from 4.91 in 1960{1965 to 2.56 in
2005{2008, with large dierences between country groups. While more developed
regions recorded a decrease from 2.67 to 1.64, the rate in less developed countries has
declined from 6.73 to 4.39.1 Unlike fertility, nancial development is a multifaceted
phenomenon; many of its indicators also reveal a similarly striking trend. For
example, the ratio of private credit to GDP has risen from 0.39 to 1.14 in high
income countries and from 0.13 to 0.31 in LDCs. Similar patterns are followed
by other nancial variables whose values measure the breadth of opportunities for
nancial investment.2
The transition from high to low fertility has been analysed in depth in the
elds of economics and demography. In the literature, the onset of a demographic
transition is often ascribed to the rise in income and education and to the reduction
in mortality (Galor (2012), surveys the literature). Indeed, increasing income brings
1The gures on fertility rates are accessible at http://data.un.org/.
2The gures on nancial structure are accessible at World Bank website and at Ross Levine's personal
website.
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about both the rise in the opportunity cost of raising children and an income
eect which implies greater investment in the education of fewer children. Since
the demographic transition often occurred during periods of sustained economic
growth, it is argued that technological progress increased the incentive for human
capital investment, causing a decline in fertility. Another important phenomenon
that accompanied the fertility transition was the signicant reduction in infant
mortality. Whatever is the reason for having children, lower mortality should allow
a smaller number of births.
Although other causes of the demographic transition have been investigated,
to date no comprehensive analysis of the role of nancial development has been
performed.3 The objective of this paper is to produce general and reliable evidence
on the eects of borrowing constraints and opportunities for nancial investment
on the choice of the number of children.
To elucidate the channels through which nancial development aects fertility,
we introduce a four-period life-cycle model of choice in which fertility is endogenous
and the household cares for its children and for its parents too. In this setting young
adults might choose to borrow some resources and, when older, to save and invest
in the capital market. We assume two main types of imperfections of nancial
markets (Pollin, 1997; McKinnon, 1973): borrowing constraints { the diculties
encountered by individuals when trying to reach their optimal level of debt { and
saving constraints, which pertain to the uneasiness encountered by individuals who
wish to invest their savings in a private nancial market. We show that in the
context of fertility determination, this distinction has both theoretical relevance
and a signicant empirical counterpart. The model shows that the eect of relaxing
the borrowing constraint on fertility depends on: (1) an investment eect, whose
positive sign is due to the reduction of future resources and to a corresponding
greater investment in children, and (2) an income eect. Hence, when children are
normal goods in a household's preferences, fertility will unambiguously increase.
Broader access to capital markets allows parents to rely less on children to fund
their old age welfare. Nonetheless, larger savings imply lower debt in the early
years of adulthood: in this case the household will command a smaller amount of
resources for consumption and children. Both eects imply that fertility decreases
with greater opportunities for nancial investment.4
3Cigno and Rosati (1992) investigate the eects of household access to capital markets on fertility
in Italy, nding empirical support for a negative eect. Some evidence on this issue comes from the
literature on microcredit programmes: these studies show some controversial eects of increased nancial
availability on fertility. Nonetheless, such nancial empowerment programmes are generally aimed at
very poor people living in LDCs; accordingly, the external validity of these studies is questionable.
4The model characterises the main relations between nancial markets and fertility choice which guide
the econometric analysis, but it does not provide a general equilibrium interpretation of the phenomenon
which would deal with the endogeneity of the nancial system. Such a model would greatly complicate
the analysis and is beyond the scope of the paper. However, in the econometric model we take into
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In the econometric analysis we use a panel of 78 countries over the period 1995{
2010 built by merging the data on fertility, social and economic indicators with those
that describe the level of nancial development and structure. Household access to
the credit market is approximated by two variables: the ratio of private credit to
GDP and the ratio of household credit to GDP. To capture the opportunities for
nancial investment we use the ratio of domestic public debt to GDP. Government
bonds are characterised by low risk and signicant supply even in economies where
more sophisticated forms of nancial investment are scant. Conrmation of this
picture comes from data produced by Beck et al. (2010) who show that the market
capitalization of public bonds has gures comparable with those of private bonds
and stocks or life insurance premiums.
One of the main challenges we faced in the econometric analysis was the possible
endogeneity of nancial variables in the fertility equation. Demographic variables
such as age are known to be important determinants of wealth allocation in the
life cycle and of risk-taking attitudes. These eects would seriously undermine any
attempt to estimate the causal eect of nancial development on fertility. Here
our approach is to apply instrumental variable methods. Indeed, we use the Index
of Financial Liberalisation produced by Abiad et al. (2009) as instrumental vari-
able for credit and saving availability.5 This index focuses on nancial markets
and measures the extent of liberalisation with respect to credit controls and re-
serve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies
on securities markets and banking regulations. It records the evolution of the in-
stitutions that directly and indirectly aect the development of nancial markets.
Reasonably, since most of this change is due to policy interventions, it should be
considered exogenous with respect to the dynamics of fertility.
Our empirical results indicate that both borrowing constraints and investment
opportunities impact fertility, yet in opposite directions, as predicted by the theory.
The estimate of the elasticity of net fertility to private credit is positive and its
value is around 32 per cent. The econometric results are conrmed when we use a
better proxy of household borrowing constraints: the value of total claims of deposit
money banks on households as ratio to GDP provided by Beck et al. (2012) for a
cross-section of 44 countries over the period 1994-2005. Using this variable in error
components 2SLS regressions we nd that the elasticity of net fertility to household
credit takes values in the interval 0.2-0.3. The eect of domestic public debt on
fertility can be quantied with an elasticity that takes negative values close to 12
per cent. These results were obtained with the estimation of a model that includes
a proxy for the pension system, which is an alternative to the nancial market in
the allocation of saving. Robustness of the econometric results to the presence
account the possible endogeneity of the proxies for borrowing and saving constraints.
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of outliers and to possible heterogeneity of the parameters across countries was
checked by the estimation of a panel quantile regression. The results signicantly
conrm and reinforce the rest of our estimates. Quantile regression also highlights
a stronger eect of borrowing in high fertility countries.
The full set of estimates highlights the importance of nancial development for
the explanation of fertility across the world. Indeed, the estimated elasticities take
values comparable with those of other fundamental variables. The net eect of
nancial variables is positive since credit availability increases fertility much more
than access to capital markets reduces it. Hence, our econometric analysis suggests
nancial development acted to curb the declining trend in reproduction which we
observe in recent decades across the world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the the-
oretical and empirical literature on the impact of nancial variables on fertility;
Section 3 describes the model determining household intertemporal allocation of
income and fertility determination; Section 4 describes the empirical implementa-
tion of the theoretical model, specication and identication issues, the data used
for estimation and the relative results; Section 5 discusses policy implications and
concludes.
2 Literature review
In the economic literature, fertility behaviour is driven by selsh or altruistic moti-
vations: adults can invest in children as an alternative to nancial investment and
public pension, or derive pleasure from children as durable consumption goods;
alternatively, parents can be altruistic and caring about their children's well-being.
The models of the rst type date back to the pioneering contribution of Leiben-
stein (1957) in which children, rather than being net consumers of family resources,
actually increase their families' lifetime wealth. Although infants are completely
dependent upon their family for their personal consumption, as they grow up they
become capable of working and transferring income back to their families. As
long as the value of resources returned by grown-up children exceeds the value of
resources consumed as infants, fertility is a nancially protable trade from the
standpoints of parents and children.
Cigno (1993) analyses the model of an extended family where members are self-
ish and follow some self-enforcing family rules according to which the parents lend
to the children and are paid back in old age. Hence, the family is a substitute for
the nancial market. When the demand for children depends on nancial returns,
the availability of alternative assets becomes crucial. When nancial markets start
providing assets which oer high returns, some families would drop fertility as an
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investment and turn to the market as the return on nancial assets exceeds the re-
turn on children. This hypothesis of complete substitutability between children and
nancial assets may be found in the development economics literature (Willis, 1980;
Schultz, 1974; Neher, 1971) and suggests that better access to nancial markets and
investment opportunities would invariably lead to a decrease in planned fertility.
Nonetheless, Razin and Sadka (1995) have shown that in a general equilibrium
analysis nancial deepening does not necessarily carry a drop in fertility. Introduc-
ing heterogeneity in preferences and technologies, as well as the basic equilibrium
identity between aggregate saving and aggregate borrowing, nancial trade oppor-
tunities allow some families to invest more in market assets and less in fertility, but
at the same time other families must do the opposite, thus increasing fertility. The
net balance between these competing forces may result in higher overall fertility.
A dierent and complementary view of the relation between nancial develop-
ment and fertility choice arises from models where it is generally assumed that
parents are interested in children per se (Hotz et al., 1997; Becker and Barro, 1988;
Willis, 1973; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker, 1960) and may nd it protable to
borrow against the future in order to nance their children's consumption and in-
vestment in human capital. In this case, nancial deepening and credit consumption
availability may induce an increase in fertility.
The empirical literature provides just a few inquiries into this topic. Cigno and
Rosati (1996) develop a model of joint determination of fertility and saving in which
fertility behaviour can be driven by two mutually exclusive reasons: altruism or
selshness. In the rst case, altruism in the utility function runs either backwards,
from parents to children, or forwards from children to parents. In the second case,
the impossibility of intertemporal trade and the decreasing value of human capital
across time make fertility the only available technology for saving for the old age.
Using cointegration analysis on time series data for Germany, Italy, UK and USA,
the authors nd evidence compatible with the selsh motivation for fertility.
Cigno and Rosati (1992), employing cointegration analysis on Italian data, doc-
uments a negative eect of capital market accessibility on fertility in the long-run.
The variable selected to proxy for nancial development is the inverse of the ratio
of currency held by the non-bank public to bank deposits. Boldrin et al. (2005)
calibrate a model of fertility with social security and nancial market imperfections
to reproduce the USA economy in 2000. They nd that the elasticity of fertility to
better access to capital markets is negative and signicant. An alternative model
by Scotese Lehr (1999) nds that nancial intermediation can inuence fertility in
an indirect fashion. In an economy with two sectors { a traditional one with low
capitalization and a modern one with high capitalization { an increase in the level of
nancial intermediation lowers the cost of capital, driving up wages in the modern
sector. Households then reduce fertility as their members shift labour supply from
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the labour-intensive sector to the capital-intensive sector. Employing a reduced-
form VAR model with panel data on 87 countries from 1965 to 1980, Scotese Lehr
nds that two measures of the extent of nancial intermediation Granger-cause a
drop in fertility. Specically, the estimated elasticity of fertility with regard to the
ratio of money to GDP is  7:7% and the elasticity with regard to the ratio of
private credit to GDP is  5:7%.
The link between nancial empowerment of women and fertility is also a subject
of investigation in the literature on evaluation of microcredit programs, although in
this regard the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Since most of such programmes
target women, the additional nancial resources provided tend to shift individual ef-
fort from childbearing to income-generating activities. At the same time, the wealth
eect can increase the demand for children when these are normal goods. For ex-
ample, some econometric studies of the Grameen Bank programme in Bangladesh
(Steele et al., 2001; Schuler and Hashemi, 1994) observe an increased use of con-
traceptives resulting in lower fertility, while others (Pitt et al., 1999; Schuler et al.,
1997) nd that the impact of the same programme on contraceptive use is in fact
negligible.
The literature surveyed in this section, while oering several competing perspec-
tives on households' fertility behavior, so far has not provided a general framework
for its analysis in the context of imperfect capital markets. More specically, pre-
vious contributions failed to distinguish between borrowing constraints and limited
access to capital markets (saving constraints). Though interlinked, these imperfec-
tions have distinctive features and dierential eects on fertility. Borrowing con-
straints refer to the inability of households to receive their optimal level of loans
from the nancial sector: in this case, the observed level of households' debt is
lower than optimal. Conversely, saving constraints refer to the insucient ability
of the nancial sector to collect savings from households: in this case, it is the
level of savings to be suboptimal, since its nancial return is constrained to be too
low. These two types of imperfections have dierent impact along the life cycle, as
typically young families are net borrowers, whereas mature families are net lenders:
accordingly, rational forward-looking fertility decisions must account for both im-
perfections. In what follows we aim to show that this overlooked distinction is
crucial to understand the complex link between nancial markets and households'
fertility behavior.
3 Theory
The model represents the choices of a household over the life cycle as determined
by altruistic relations in the family and by the trading relations with nancial
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markets. We model intergenerational altruism assuming that parents care about
the well-being of their children and their parents. Adults care about consumption
of their children and fund it with transfers; similarly, grown-up children make gifts
to their parents to sustain their old age consumption. This theoretical approach
to altruistic preferences (Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989) is fairly general and widely
adopted in the literature on the demand for children (Boldrin and Jones, 2002;
Wigger, 1999; Nishimura and Zhang, 1992; Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; Eckstein and
Wolpin, 1985).
The time sequences of household expenditure and income over the life cycle im-
ply the need to borrow resources in the rst years of adulthood and the incentive
to save and invest in the capital market later on. Capital markets can be perfect,
meaning that households can borrow and save the optimal amounts consistent with
their intertemporal budget constraint. Several forms of imperfections, nonethe-
less, may limit credit availability to households with signicant consequences on
their decisions. Similarly, opportunities for nancial investment can be scarce in
economies where property rights are not well enforced and informational asymme-
tries between lenders and borrowers are severe. This situation has been termed
a savings constraint in the literature (Pollin, 1997) and refers to the adverse role
on savings played by a low level of nancial deepening (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw,
1973). In this case, investing in children is an alternative to poor nancial market
conditions.
In what follows, for expository convenience, we rst present the model with
perfect nancial markets, and then we turn to the distinct cases of borrowing con-
straints and limited access to capital markets. Though real economies often present
both types of market imperfections, this expository strategy aords a better un-
derstanding of the consequences of each kind of market failure on fertility choice.
3.1 Timing and budget constraints
A household lives for four periods: it is young in the rst, young adult in the second,
adult in the third, and old in the fourth. Children are born during their parents'
young adulthood and neither work nor have resources; they live with their parents
who spend some resources to rear them. Young adults work and take care of their
nt children during the rst period of adulthood; they still work when adult and take
care of their old parents; they retire when old. The choice problem starts in the
second period of life and spans the three remaining periods. The life-cycle utility
function of a household member who is a young adult at date t is:
U = v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

; (1)
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where superscript denotes the period of life (0; 1; 2; 3), c1t is consumption during
early adulthood, nt is the number of children, c
2
t+1 is consumption during late
adulthood, c3t+2 is consumption during old age, and c
3
t+1 is consumption of the par-
ents during their own old age. The functions v(), u(), g() are strictly concave and
satisfy Inada conditions. Assuming that household utility is increasing in each ar-
gument, two of them represent altruism in the family: children (nt) and old parents'
consumption (c3t+1), implying forward and backward altruism, respectively.
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During each period, choices are constrained by intertemporal and intratemporal
requirements according to the following schedule:
 In the second period of their life (1) agents become adult and start working,
get married, become parents, and use debt to nance their consumption and
the cost of their children which includes consumption and other expenditures
(e.g., education, health); they may face borrowing constraints. The budget
constraint is:
c1t = (1  nt)w1t +Dt (2)
where  is the cost of raising one child as a share of the labour income, w1t ,
and Dt is the amount of debt.
 In the third period (2) parents keep working, pay back their debt, and save
for their own old age. In addition, they support their parents by transferring
money to them. At the beginning of the same period, the children leave
parental house and start working. The budget constraint is:
c2t+1 = w
2
t+1  Rt+1Dt   qt+1   st+1 (3)
where w2t+1 is labour income, Rt+1  1 + rt+1 and rt+1 is the interest rate,
qt+1 is a money transfer towards parents, and st+1 is the value of saving.
During the same time period the agent's parents face the following budget
constraint:
c3t+1 = Rt+1st + nt 1qt+1 (4)
where qt+1 is the amount of transfers received by the parents from each child.
 In the fourth period (3) agents do not work because of their old age. They live
on payments from previous nancial investments and possibly from transfers
from their children. The budget constraint is
c3t+2 = Rt+2st+1 + ntqt+2 (5)
6Altruistic parents take care of both the number and consumption of children. We simplify the
analysis assuming that child consumption is given exogenous. The assumption of an exogenously given
xed cost per child is a standard in the literature.
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where qt+2 is the amount of transfers received by parents from each child.
3.2 The optimal choice
The young adult optimisation programme consists in maximising the utility func-
tion (1) with respect to life-cycle consumption, the number of children, and parents'
consumption, subject to the budget constraints (2)-(5). Following the literature
(e.g., Lagerlof (1997); Nishimura and Zhang (1992)), we assume the household max-
imises the utility function, taking the future decisions of the children as given. The
optimality conditions characterise the trade-o between the household's consump-
tion in dierent ages. The adult also chooses the gift for her/his parent by equating
the marginal increase of utility she/he derives from greater parent's consumption to
the marginal utility cost, which is equally shared with siblings. Similarly, the opti-
mal choice of the number of children follows from the balance between the marginal
cost of a child in terms of utility and two marginal benets: the rst derives from
greater child consumption and the second from the increase in parent's future con-
sumption due to nancial support.7 By the same token, household optimal choices
imply that the gross rate of return on children { the ratio between the value of the
gift divided by the cost of a child net of the benet in terms of current consumption
{ is equal to the rate of return on nancial investment:
qt+2
w1t   @v=@nt@v=@c1t
= Rt+1Rt+2: (6)
The model accounts for some of the most important features of adult life and
highlights how they are aected by the nancial markets. When these markets
work perfectly, the optimal decisions of the parents can be fully realized. In this
respect, further insights come from the comparative statics of nt with respect to
some of the most important parameters. Proofs of the results are in the appendix.
The comparative statics eect of wages on fertility can be split into two parts.
The rst represents the cost of children and is negative. The second part is a
combination between the standard income eect (positive when children are normal
goods) and the negative eect of income on the decision to invest in children.
Greater support from the children to the parents has two eects on fertility: qt+2
increases nt since it modies the trade-o between marginal benet and marginal
cost of fertility by increasing the return from investing in children, while the same
change in qt+2 has income eects which are similar to those already discussed.
An increase in the interest rate has several eects on nt. As the nancial alterna-
7With regard to the trade-o between private consumption and fertility at time t, we assume that
w1t > qt+2=(Rt+1Rt+2), i.e., that child rearing costs are large enough to forbid annihilation of consump-
tion. This conditions obtains an internally signicant solution for fertility (nt <1).
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tive to investment in children yields a higher return, fertility becomes more costly.
In addition, the household faces stronger incentives to shift expenditure from cur-
rent items, c1t ; nt, to the future, c
2
t+1, c
3
t+1, c
3
t+2. The income eect of the interest
rate depends on the net nancial position of the household, which can borrow more
than the amount it saves, or just the opposite. The resulting eect depends on the
balance between the two income eects we identied in the discussion of the eect
of wages on fertility.
Now, suppose that households cannot borrow against the future the desired
amount of resources, since they undergo rationing in nancial markets. This addi-
tional constraint prevents expenditure on children and consumption of young adults
from exceeding the total amount of resources available during the rst period of
adulthood:
c1t = (1  nt)w1t +Dt (7)
where Dt is the highest amount of resources that can be borrowed, exogenously
given. The rst order conditions for this problem resemble those found in the case
without borrowing constraint. As shown in appendix, the inuence of w1t on nt
can be interpreted in terms of income and cost of children eects as in the case of
perfect markets. The same can be said of the comparative statics eect of the gift
qt+2 on nt. If the gift from each child increases, then parents can obtain the desired
old-age consumption by raising fewer children.
Higher credit availability will impact on household fertility according to two
causal eects. As the value of D grows - more credit is available to households
- young parents command a greater amount of their future resources, and spend
these resources on consumption and children. Since children are normal goods
in household preferences then nt will increase. Furthermore, the same increase
in D means less income available for consumption during retirement. Hence, the
household will react by increasing investment in children, i.e., raising the number
of children nt.
8 Both eects imply the sign of dnt dDt is positive.
Since children can also provide support for their retired parents, fertility be-
comes crucial in determining the optimal amount of saving. We analyse the model
of household choice by assuming that the optimal desired value of saving st+1 is
higher than the ceiling st+1. Hence, adults face the following constraint:
c3t+2 = Rt+2st+1 + ntqt+2; (8)
8If the model allowed for the quantity/quality trade-o, the parent could react to less resources during
old age reducing fertility and investing more in the education of her children. This extension of the model
would greatly complicate the derivation of comparative statics results. In any case, the negative eect
on fertility due to greater child education does not imply a reversion of the positive sign of the overall
eect of credit availability on fertility.
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which shows that both nancial investment and children contribute to ensure old
age consumption. When the savings constraint is binding while household borrow-
ing is not restricted, the life cycle utility maximisation programme highlights the
consequences of greater access to nancial investment.
Again, the analysis of the eects of labour income on fertility can follow the
lines of the preceding cases. The same can be said of the eects of qt+2 and R on
nt. According to comparative statics, fertility decreases with st+1. Indeed, there is
a trade-o between the investment in children and that in nancial activities since
greater nancial investment opportunities reduce the need to raise children for old
age consumption. Furthermore, given the intertemporal budget constraint, when
st+1 increases, young adults reduce their debt. As a result, their resources will be
lower and fertility will drop.
In summary, our model suggests that improved access to credit induces house-
holds to have more children, while fertility unambiguously decreases with easier
access to capital markets.9 In the following, we search for econometric evidence
consistent with these predictions of the model.
4 Empirical analysis
The econometric exercise is carried out to nd evidence for an economically signif-
icant impact of nancial markets on fertility behaviour. In our estimates we use
an unbalanced panel of ve-year time series covering the period 1995{2010 for a
maximum number of countries equal to 78. We rst introduce our empirical spec-
ication, then turn to data description, and nally show various estimates along
with some robustness checks.
4.1 Model specication
Our theoretical model predicts that desired fertility should be responsive, in op-
posite directions, both to borrowing constraints and to opportunities to access the
capital markets. This feature is peculiar to our approach, since the literature does
not distinguish between dierent sources of imperfections in nancial markets.
The focus of our analysis is the number of surviving children, and the depen-
dent variable of the econometric model should correctly approximate for desired
fertility. In many countries infant/child mortality is not negligible, and may cause
a signicant dierence between the number of births and the number of surviving
9Our model does not consider the case for bequests from parents to children. This extension of the
model would not change the sign of the eect of released credit constraints on the young adult resources,
hence on fertility. However, it would imply that the old age security hypothesis does not hold for obvious
reasons. The resulting model would miss an important part of the explanation of fertility trends in the
world.
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children. In this respect, the use of the total fertility rate should be accompanied
by the inclusion of child mortality among the explanatory variables. However, mor-
tality variables are generally considered endogenous to fertility. The literature on
the eect of child mortality on fertility deals with endogeneity with the selection of
instrumental variables useful to reduce the bias in parameter estimates. However,
the search is arduous and there is no broad agreement on the proposed instrumental
variables. Furthermore, the role of child mortality in the demographic transition
has been questioned in the recent debate (Galor, 2012). Indeed, theory clearly
states that if parents appreciate surviving children, when mortality declines they
reduce the number of births, leaving desired fertility unchanged. This could not
be the case if survival were uncertain and parents had a precautionary demand for
children. The evidence on the relevance of this theoretical hypothesis seems quite
scant (Doepke (2005); Galor (2012)). In the context of this paper, the endogeneity
of mortality would add to those of nancial variables and per capita GDP, making
the econometric analysis really hard. This is the main reason why we choose to
approximate net fertility with the net reproduction rate (NRR). According to the
denition of the United Nations, NRR is: "The average number of daughters a
hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period
if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility rates and the mortality
rates of a given period. It is expressed as number of daughters per woman." The
use of NRR as an alternative to the total fertility rate is common in the literature
and is the choice of Scotese Lehr (2009) and Angeles (2010) among others.10
In what follows, we assume that the parameters qt+2 and  dier across coun-
tries, but stay constant across time for each country. From the empirical point of
view, fertility choice is deeply intertwined with a large number of economic and
social variables. Many of these variables are unobservable in the publicly available
data collections while others are intrinsically non-dimensional, like those related to
deeply rooted mental habits, cultural inuences, religious traditions, and the like.
Given that these variables change only slowly, the xed-eect panel estimator is
the elective method of estimation. Accordingly, we formulate the empirical model:
NRRi;t = 0 +BOR
0
i;t1 + FIN
0
i;t2 +X
0
i;t3 + ui + t + "i;t (9)
where BOR is a vector of variables used to approximate the ease of access to
borrowing, FIN is a vector of variables describing the development of investment
opportunities in capital markets, X is a set of variables which account for the main
determinants of fertility, u is a country-specic, time-unvarying, random variable
10Though our theoretical model is developed under the assumption that planned and actual fertility
coincide, to allow for discrepancies between them would be a straightforward mathematical extension.
For an example see Azarnert (2006).
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potentially correlated with the explanatory variables,  is a time eect, and " is
a scalar disturbance term with E["] = 0. The subscript i is for countries, while t
is for time periods. Each time observation is the average of the value of a given
variable over a non-overlapping ve-year period. The set of controls X includes per
capita GDP, female and male education, and the rate of urbanisation.11 This set
also includes a proxy of the availability of public pension programmes. Indeed, in
many countries, governments provide elders with publicly funded pensions nanced
through a pay-as-you-go system. This intergenerational transfer is made up by
taxation on youths and a corresponding transfer to elders. Public pension systems
diminish the need to access private nancial markets for old age support, resulting
at least in a partial oset of freely-chosen savings. In this context, the inclusion of
some measure of public pensions in eq. (9) could bring about a lower or negligible
coecient for private nancial markets. Hence, the observed correlation between
nancial opportunities and fertility would simply mask a genuine causal relation
running from public pensions to fertility. In our econometric analysis of cross-
country fertility, other important control variables are the public expenditure on
children (CHILDRENEXP) (see, e.g., Borck and Wrohlich (2011)) and the share of
people who adhere to Catholic (CATHOLICS) and Islamic (MUSLIMS) religions.
Data on these variables refer to one time period only, and we use them in random
eects IV estimates.
The hypothesis that nancial variables are endogenous to the NRR is of
paramount importance in model estimation. Indeed, the rate of population change
modies the age structure which is one of the determinants of the allocation of
assets in the life cycle. Age aects household portfolio choice trough inuence on
the degree of risk aversion. If household preferences change over time then the birth
year could have similar consequences on nancial decisions.
Instrumental variable methods allow unbiased parameter estimates when vari-
ables strongly correlated with the endogenous variables and uncorrelated with the
model error are used as instruments. We instrument the variables approximat-
ing for credit and nancial investment with the Index of Financial Liberalisation
(FINREFORM) produced at IMF (Abiad et al., 2009) . The recent history of the
nancial sector in developed and developing countries highlights the importance of
state intervention until a diused process of liberalisation and deregulation took
place starting from the early 1980s. Previously, the state had an important role in
the ownership of banks and the allocation of credit was strongly regulated. Entry
barriers restricted the supply of nancial services and limited competition. Liber-
alisation of nancial markets was the outcome of policy reforms implemented by
11In preliminary estimates the set of controls included the real interest rate, but its parameter was
always not signicant. Hence, in the following, we present regression results from models excluding the
interest rate.
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governments in many countries. Often, those reforms were caused by events like
economic crises, the formation of a new government, and the intervention of interna-
tional nancial institutions (Abiad and Mody, 2005). Hence, nancial liberalisation
can be considered exogenous to the choice of fertility.
The process of nancial liberalisation can be interpreted in a political economy
framework where a policy reform can be favoured by some interest groups which
face the opposition of other groups who gain more in the status quo (Burgoon et al.,
2012). In this context, the quality of political institutions aects the likelihood of
reforms in nancial markets. In the same framework, Rajan and Zingales (2003)
show that the opposition to nancial liberalisation can be weakened by openness
to trade and to capital ows. We agree with Rajan and Zingales and use the ratio
between foreign trade and GDP (TRADE) as an instrumental variable for credit
constraints and access to nancial investment.
The econometric model allows for the likely endogeneity of per capita GDP as
a consequence of reverse causality from the dynamics of population to economic
growth. Hence, we add to the set of IVs the ination rate (INFLATION),the index
of investment freedom (INVESTFREEDOM) of the Heritage Foundation and the
ratio of foreign trade to GDP. The rst variable captures the impact of monetary
policy on the economy, while openness is one of the main determinants of economic
growth, as well as the constraints to private investment. We also expect signicant
eects of FINREFORM on GDP per capita because they are well documented in
the literature.
4.2 Data description
The dependent variable in our regressions is the net reproduction rate which we
take from the United Nations, World Population Prospects 2010.
The econometric model includes the main determinants of fertility (e.g., Ehrlich
and Kim (2007); Schultz (1997)). Five variables approximate for the system of in-
centives faced by households in the choice of fertility. Data on the GDP per capita
in 2005 purchasing parity units (GDP) come from the World Bank, World Develop-
ment Indicators 2010 (WDI). The average years of schooling of women (SCHOOL-
INGFEM) and the average years of schooling of men (SCHOOLINGMAL), both
aged 15 and over, are from the dataset of Barro and Lee (2010). As a proxy of
public pensions we consider the ratio of public social protection (excluding health)
expenditure to GDP (SSECURITY).12 The source of these data is the IMF and they
are available at the site of the International Labour Oce for the years 1995-2007.
We also include in some specications the variable CHILDRENEXP. This variable
12For a comprehensive survey on the economic and political factors shaping modern social security
systems see Galasso and Profeta (2002).
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accounts for the public social protection expenditure on benets for children as a
percentage of GDP. Data are released by the ILO for the years from 2008 to 2011.
Given the sparse nature of this variable, in the estimates we consider this variable
time unvarying and apply random eects panel methods. The social and economic
characteristics of the environment relevant to reproduction are approximated by
the rate of urbanisation (URBAN), drawn from the World Bank, WDI 2010, and
by the variables CATHOLICS and MUSLIMS that refer to the year 2000 and are
from Barro (2003).
Access to nancial markets is approximated by three variables. Following the
literature on other household choices (e.g., savings and education, Loayza et al.
(2000); De Gregorio (1996)), we use the ratio of private credit by deposit money
banks to GDP (PRIVCRED) as a proxy for borrowing constraints. Data on this
variable come from the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World
Bank Research Department (Beck et al. (2000)). While private credit includes
credit to the business sector, Beck et al. (2012) provide the ratio of household
credit (HOUSECRED) to GDP for 45 countries averaged over the years 1994-2005.
We use this better proxy for access to credit as a robustness check of our regression
results.
To capture the degree of development of the other side of capital markets,
namely nancial investment, we use data on one of the most popular forms of
investment: public bonds. Indeed, often countries where nancial markets nd the
minimal conditions for their existence see the signicant presence of assets issued
by the public administration, as shown by Beck et al. (2010). Actually, the supply
of public bonds is favoured by the considerable size of state assets in every mod-
ern economy and the consequent low risk of default which attracts a wide public
of risk-averse savers. The sustained and widespread growth of public expenditure
worldwide after World War II was another major reason for the increase in the
share of public bonds on nancial markets. However, public bonds can also be sold
to foreign institutions. Hence, external public debt cannot be used to approximate
the range of nancial investment opportunities available to domestic households.
We use the data from Panizza (2008) to obtain the ratio of domestic public debt
held by residents to GDP (DEBT) for more than 100 countries in the years from
1990 to 2007.
The following variables are used as instruments. The Index of Financial Liber-
alisation (FINREFORM) is constructed by Abiad et al. (2009) as the sum of seven
components measuring reforms in credit controls and reserve requirements, interest
rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, bank-
ing regulations and restrictions on the capital account. Data refer to 91 countries
over the period 1973{2005. INVESTFREEDOM is one of the components of the
Index of Economic Freedom produced by The Heritage Foundation. The set of IV
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is completed by two variables drawn from WDI: the ination rate, and the ratio of
foreign trade to GDP.
The dependent variable NRR and all the explanatory variables but SSECU-
RITY, are expressed in logarithms.
The sources and description of the data of each variable are reported in table
1, while basic statistics and a correlation matrix are reported in table 2. The
reported gures are for the complete sample, while the various subsamples used
for estimation are made up of observations for which the whole set of variables {
dependent and independent { are non-missing. Accordingly, each estimation table
reports the number of countries and the number of observations included in the
calculation.
4.3 Econometric Methods and Results
The model is estimated under dierent specications and with dierent methods.
Specications start from the basic equation, to which we add PRIVCRED and
DEBT. We estimate a panel xed eects model using OLS and two IV methods:
two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Limited Information Maxi-
mum Likelihood (LIML). OLS, GMM and LIML adopt clustered by country robust
estimators of the standard errors of the model.13
Table 4 presents the OLS xed eects estimates of several models. Among the
most important determinants of the net reproduction rate we nd the ratio of
private credit to GDP that shows a signicant positive eect with an elasticity of
15%. The variables DEBT and SSECURITY have signicant parameter estimates
with a negative sign as expected. The estimate of the elasticity of NRR to DEBT
is  5:1%.
The endogeneity of per capita GDP and the nancial variables is addressed with
IV estimates presented in Table 5. GMM provides ecient parameter estimates {
i.e., with minimum asymptotic variance { under general heteroskedasticity. The
LIML estimator is a useful alternative because it is more robust to the presence of
weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005), although it assumes i.i.d. errors. Table 5
shows the results of the estimation of the same specications of Table 4 with GMM
and LIML. Table 6 provides a large set of statistics useful for the evaluation of IV
estimates. The results of the rst-stage regression for the model with PRIVCRED
and the model with DEBT are in Table 7.
In the IV regression results, the basic model of fertility is conrmed and rein-
forced. Indeed, almost in every specication the schooling variables and the rate of
urbanisation show signicant and sizeable parameters. Per capita GDP conrms
the minor role it displays in OLS estimates, which is not peculiar to this paper.
13The computation was conducted using the STATA command xtivreg2 (Baum et al., 2003).
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The model which includes PRIVCRED among regressors is estimated with GMM
and LIML using INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM
as instruments for the endogenous variables per capita GDP and PRIVCRED. It
is worth noting the small dierence of GMM with respect to LIML parameter es-
timates, notwithstanding the lack of robustness to heteroskedasticity of the latter
estimation method. The parameter of PRIVCRED is still signicant and positive,
showing a value around 0.32, greater than the OLS estimate. The positive eect of
instrumenting PRIVCRED on its parameter estimate can be explained as the ef-
fect of measurement error due to the statistical content of the variable that includes
not just credit to households, but credit to the business sector too. Instrumental
variables may correct the attenuation eect in OLS estimates. In the following we
will present the estimation results of a model that includes a measure of credit to
households.
The results of the IV estimation of the eect of access to nancial investment on
net fertility are presented in Table 5. The set of instruments for GDP and DEBT
includes the variables: INFLATION, INFLATION squared, TRADE, and FINRE-
FORM. The addition of the ratio of domestic public debt to GDP to the basic
model provides a test of the theory in section 3. Indeed, IV estimates conrm the
results of OLS regressions which maintain that greater opportunities of nancial
investment reduce the desired number of children. The joint signicance of the pa-
rameters of PRIVCRED and DEBT provides support to one of the main results of
the theory that maintains borrowing constraints and access to nancial investment
have quite distinct eects on household behaviour and fertility. When the model in-
cludes both DEBT and PRIVCRED, the estimated elasticity of DEBT amounts to
around  13%, while the same elasticity remains close to 30% for PRIVCRED. The
model in the last column of Table 5 displays the results of the estimates with the
inclusion of the controls CHILDRENEXP, CATHOLICS, MUSLIMS and a dummy
variable for high-income OECD countries to the set of explanatory variables. Be-
cause these variables do not vary over time, we apply the two-stage least-squares
error-components model (EC2SLS) proposed by Baltagi (1981). The main results
of model estimation remain robust after the enlargement of the set of explanatory
variables.
The reliability of the results of IV estimation depends on several hypotheses
which underlie the use of GMM and LIML methods. Table 6 presents the statistics
of some tests of the general specication and the quality of instrumental variables.
The Sargan-Hansen J statistic is a general test of specication that under the null
maintains the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. In the case of EC2SLS,
this statistic also tests the hypothesis of random eects. The values of the J statistic
in Table 6 show that the specications cannot be rejected. Furthermore, a recent
strand of the econometric literature highlights the risks involved in the use of ex-
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cluded instrument which are not strongly correlated with the endogenous variables.
Underidentication of an endogenous variable can be tested by the Angrist-Pischke
chi-squared statistic (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The values of the statistic we
obtain are clearly against the null of underidentication of each of the three en-
dogenous variables.
The Angrist-Pischke F statistic allows a test of weak identication. This phe-
nomenon arises when the correlation between the endogenous variable and its in-
struments is not zero but small. Critical values for this test are not available. One
possibility is the use of the Stock-Yogo (Stock and Yogo, 2005) critical values for
the Cragg-Donald F statistic with one endogenous regressor. The null hypothesis is
that a given group of instruments is weak against the alternative that it is strong,
under two denitions of weak instruments: instruments are weak if the bias of the
IV estimator, relative to the bias of OLS, could exceed a certain threshold b; in-
struments are weak if the conventional -level Wald test based on IV statistics has
an actual size that could exceed a certain threshold r. Interestingly, Stock-Yogo
critical values for LIML estimates are lower than those for GMM, reecting greater
robustness of the former method to the presence of weak instruments. Applying
the test to the endogenous variables in Table 6, we nd strong rejection of the
null with respect to GDP, while PRIVCRED and DEBT often lead to the rejection
of the weak IV hypothesis. In this respect, Table 6 displays the estimates of the
Anderson-Rubin (Anderson and Rubin, 1949) test statistic that is robust to the
use of weak instruments. The null hypothesis maintains the coecients of the en-
dogenous regressors are jointly equal to zero. The estimated values in Table 6 show
that in most of the specications the null cannot be accepted. The relevance of the
instruments we use in estimates can be further appreciated with a glance at Table
7 that presents the rst stage estimation results. In particular, FINREFORM and
other IVs enter the equations with signicant parameters, as expected.
One question which arises from the use of PRIVCRED as a proxy for household
borrowing constraints is the inclusion of credit channelled to the business sector. Al-
though both components of private credit probably display similar temporal trends
and high cross-country correlation, the robustness of the results we obtained should
be assessed through the use of data specic to household credit. In this regard, we
consider data on household credit (HOUSECRED) available for a cross-section of
44 countries over the period 1994-2005. Here, we apply again EC2SLS methods.
The results are in table 8. We estimate four models which include HOUSECRED
among regressors. The dierences depend on the inclusion of DEBT and CHIL-
DRENEXP among explanatory variables with eects on the number of countries
in the sample. When the endogenous variables are GDP and HOUSECRED the
instruments are: INFLATION, TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM.
To estimate models that assume GDP, HOUSECREDIT, and DEBT are endoge-
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nous variables we use INFLATION, INFLATION squared, TRADE, FINREFORM,
and INVESTFREEDOM as IVs. The parameter of HOUSECRED is again posi-
tive and precisely estimated, displaying an elasticity with respect to NRR in the
range 20-30%. Hence, the use of a better proxy for household credit provides a
more realistic estimate of the eect of borrowing constraints on fertility. We also
provide a further test of the robustness of our results to model specication with
the estimation of an equation that includes the share of government consumption
in GDP (SHAREGOVCONS). Indeed, although our estimates take several forms
of government intervention into account, some could be missing and they could be
approximated by SHAREGOVCONS. Data on SHAREGOVCONS are from Penn
World Tables 8.0. The results of GMM and LIML within panel estimates are shown
in the last two columns of table 8. The inclusion of SHAREGOVCONS is justied
and the overall results are signicantly conrmed. More in general, table 8 shows
how DEBT enters all the specications with signicant parameter estimates close
to  0:10.
The complete econometric exercise not only highlights the importance of nan-
cial development for the choice of the number of children, but it also claries that
the positive eect of released borrowing constraints exceeds the negative one due to
more extensive access to capital markets. Hence, nancial development does seem
responsible for a check on the declining trend of fertility worldwide.
4.4 Quantile regression
The picture obtained by the preceding set of estimations provides evidence that
nancial development, proxied by PRIVCRED and DEBT, does play a role in the
determination of fertility. Nonetheless, it may be of interest to check the robustness
of our estimates to outliers and whether the size of the estimated eects carries
over the whole distribution of fertility; this is also motivated by the prior that
countries with high levels of fertility (typically those of the Sub-Saharan area)
may react dierently than those which already have transitioned to permanently
low fertility because of unobserved variables. To address this issue, we employ a
quantile regression estimator (Koenker, 2005) on our panel of countries and account
for the xed eect component using the two-step method suggested by Fitzenberger
(2012):
1. we regress the net reproduction rate on the standard set of regressors, includ-
ing two dummies for temporal eects, using a FE-OLS estimator; next, we
subtract from the net reproduction rate the estimated xed eect;
2. we perform quantile regressions of the resulting variable on the standard set
of regressors.
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Finally, we bootstrap standard errors. The results for this exercise are displayed
in table 9 and substantially corroborate the previous econometric analysis based
on conditional mean functions. The evidence suggests that, with the exception
of URBAN, SSECURITY, and DEBT, all regressors show a substantial degree of
heterogeneity across the fertility spectrum. More specically, women's and men's
schooling vary across quantiles without following any denite trend, while PRIV-
CRED and GDP follow a detectable pattern. The positive eect of PRIVCRED
on fertility is relatively low (0:111) for the rst percentiles { the countries with low
fertility { whereas it doubles (0.217) at top fertility percentile. This result shows
a very peculiar type of unintended consequences of nancial development: interest-
ingly, high fertility countries may see their fertility problems aected by nancial
opportunities more than low fertility countries.
More generally, we nd that the gradient of the eect of GDP is increasing
across quantiles, going from 0:041 to a negligible  0:004 (p = 0:749): this suggests
that the negative role of income on fertility is larger in countries with very low
fertility, whereas this eect is very small in countries with very high fertility, prob-
ably because of the low degree of substitution between home- and market-produced
goods and opportunities. In sum, the quantile regression approach suggests that
the commonly observed negative relation between fertility and income is highly
nonlinear and mediated by nancial markets.
5 Final remarks
The objective of this paper was to investigate the role of nancial market imper-
fections in determining fertility using international panel data. Our results appear
useful to interpret the main trends observed in fertility in the world in recent years:
the declining number of children per woman is fundamentally caused by growing
income and human capital and wider female participation in the labour force. Dur-
ing this period, households' indebtedness is known (Harvey, 2004) to have sharply
increased while nancial markets further developed with a burst of innovation.
According to our estimates, the development of nancial markets has positively in-
uenced the fertility rate. Indeed, household behaviour has led to a signicant shift
of resources in the life cycle from the later stages of adulthood to the earlier ones.
Greater debt has brought about an incentive to invest in children to compensate for
the negative eects on old-age consumption. Broader access to nancial investment
has had an important income eect (negative) on fertility choice of young adults.
Hence, nancial development exercised signicant inuence on the fertility choice of
households but in two opposite directions. In this respect, our paper highlights the
powerful connections between nancial markets and fertility choices, substantially
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overlooked in the existing literature, with an aggregate cross-country perspective.
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6 Tables
TABLE 1
Description of variables
Availability
Variable Description/Source From Until
NRR Log of net reproduction rate: number of children born to an average
woman over her reproductive years
1995 2010
United Nations (2010)
GDP Log of per capita gross domestic product (2005's PPP units) 1995 2010
URBAN Log of urbanization rate 1995 2010
INFLATION Ination rate, consumer prices (annual percent change) 1995 2010
TRADE Foreign trade (percentage of GDP) 1995 2010
The World Bank (2010), World Development Indicators
SCHOOLINGFEM Log of average years of schooling of women aged 15 and over 1995 2010
SCHOOLINGMAL Log of average years of schooling of men aged 15 and over 1995 2010
Barro and Lee (2010)
CATHOLICS Percentage of catholics in the population 2000 2000
MUSLIMS Percentage of muslims in the population 2000 2000
Barro (2003)
PRIVCRED Log of total private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, deated 1995 2010
Beck et al. (2000)
DEBT Log of public sector's domestic debt to GDP 1995 2007
Panizza (2008)
SSECURITY Social security payments to GDP 1995 2010
CHILDRENEXP Children expenditure to GDP 1995 2010
ILO, The Social Security Expenditure Database
SHAREGOVCONS Log of share of government consumption at current PPPsc 1995 2005
Penn World Table, version 8.0
FINREFORM Index of nancial reforms 1995 2005
Abiad et al. (2009)
HOUSECRED Log of total outstanding claims of deposit money banks on households as
ratio to GDP
Average 1994{2005
Beck et al. (2012)
INVESTFREEDOM Freedom of investment 1995 2010
Heritage Foundation (2012)
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TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics
Quartiles
Variable N Mean  Min Max 25% 50% 75%
NRR 574 0.19 0.43 -0.90 1.04 -0.16 0.18 0.59
GDP 529 8.60 1.27 5.62 11.26 7.57 8.65 9.61
URBAN 606 3.89 0.53 2.03 4.61 3.55 4.03 4.30
INFLATION 494 0.08 0.11 -0.37 0.99 0.03 0.05 0.08
TRADE 539 90.24 49.96 0.67 422.02 56.68 80.05 112.27
SCHOOLINGFEM 432 2.05 0.44 0.51 2.62 1.82 2.19 2.36
SCHOOLINGMAL 432 1.97 0.43 0.05 2.55 1.77 2.09 2.27
CATHOLICS 342 0.30 0.33 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.11 0.58
MUSLIMS 342 0.25 0.36 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.04 0.39
PRIVCRED 459 0.33 0.25 0.02 1.31 0.13 0.27 0.48
DEBT 337 2.80 1.02 0.00 4.80 2.18 2.95 3.56
SSECURITY 217 9.54 6.85 0.01 24.32 3.20 9.26 15.58
CHILDRENEXP 264 0.97 1.07 0.00 4.15 0.13 0.54 1.46
SHAREGOVCONS 501 0.20 0.11 -0.00 0.78 0.13 0.17 0.25
FINREFORM 270 13.74 4.77 0.81 21.00 10.40 14.10 17.60
HOUSECRED 135 0.28 0.24 0.03 0.99 0.08 0.18 0.42
INVESTFREEDOM 496 51.33 18.91 10.00 90.00 35.00 50.00 70.00
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TABLE 4
Fixed effects estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 0:075 0:003 0:114 0:019
(1:142) (0:035) (1:547) (0:210)
SCHOOLINGFEM  0:703  0:546  1:044  0:837
( 0:809) ( 0:633) ( 1:124) ( 0:935)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0:454 0:379 0:917 0:774
(0:490) (0:416) (0:914) (0:802)
URBAN  0:464**  0:512**  0:260  0:255
( 2:370) ( 2:275) ( 1:219) ( 1:057)
SSECURITY  0:007  0:008  0:010**  0:012***
( 1:373) ( 1:453) ( 2:298) ( 2:831)
PRIVCRED 0:146** 0:148**
(2:435) (2:007)
DEBT  0:051**  0:044
( 2:233) ( 1:578)
Statistics
Observations 201 195 158 152
Countries 78 76 70 68
R2 Within 0:319 0:381 0:433 0:497
F test prob. for time dummies 0:000 0:000 0:001 0:001
Notes   Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Temporal dummies are in-
cluded. Country-clustered Student's t in parentheses. Statistical signicance asterisks: * =
10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
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TABLE 8
Robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0:034  0:023 0:046  0:008  0:384**  0:451**
(0:371) ( 0:252) (0:491) ( 0:080) ( 2:342) ( 2:330)
HOUSECREDIT 0:266*** 0:198** 0:305*** 0:226*
(3:133) (2:089) (3:269) (1:764)
SCHOOLINGFEM  1:095  1:293  1:279  0:884  3:490***  3:644***
( 1:221) ( 1:248) ( 0:850) ( 0:509) ( 3:249) ( 3:165)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0:812 0:931 1:095 0:450 3:731*** 3:946***
(0:911) (0:834) (0:728) (0:254) (3:201) (3:138)
URBAN  0:369*  0:258  0:569**  0:420*  0:490*  0:467
( 1:760) ( 1:211) ( 2:325) ( 1:680) ( 1:717) ( 1:536)
SSECURITY  0:004  0:007*  0:001  0:006  0:003  0:003
( 0:824) ( 1:737) ( 0:176) ( 0:809) ( 0:534) ( 0:374)
DEBT  0:067**  0:096**  0:105***  0:108***
( 2:029) ( 2:075) ( 2:839) ( 2:612)
CHILDRENEXP 0:008 0:012
(0:164) (0:218)
PRIVCRED 0:368* 0:445*
(1:909) (1:924)
SHAREGOVCONS  0:384*  0:426*
( 1:857) ( 1:886)
Statistics
Observations 106 81 94 69 108 108
Countries 41 37 35 31 44 44
R2 0:445 0:475 0:446 0:543 0:373 0:296
Hansen J
Statistic 12:697 7:153 14:878 13:928 3:040 2:885
p-value 0:391 0:894 0:248 0:379 0:219 0:236
Notes   Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Bootstrapped Student's t in
parentheses. Models 1   4 are estimated with EC2SLS, model 5 with GMM, model 6 with
LIML. Models 1 and 3 include as instruments for GDP and HOUSECREDIT: INFLATION,
TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREEDOM. Models 2 and 4 include as instruments for
GDP, HOUSECREDIT, and DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, TRADE, FINREFORM,
and INVESTFREEDOM. Model 5 and 6 include as instruments for GDP, PRIVCRED, and
DEBT: INFLATION, INFLATION2, Log of TRADE, FINREFORM, and INVESTFREE-
DOM. Temporal and regional dummies included. Statistical signicance asterisks: * = 10%,
** = 5%, *** = 1%.
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TABLE 9
Quantile regressions
Quantiles of the distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
SCHOOLINGFEM  0:914***  0:795***  0:839***  0:841***  0:698***
( 6:323) ( 7:603) ( 8:002) ( 5:889) ( 4:106)
SCHOOLINGMAL 0:765*** 0:695*** 0:775*** 0:812*** 0:664***
(5:014) (6:303) (7:006) (5:394) (3:704)
URBAN  0:259***  0:261***  0:255***  0:249***  0:261***
( 16:351) ( 22:791) ( 22:253) ( 15:938) ( 14:026)
SSECURITY  0:011***  0:012***  0:012***  0:012***  0:011***
( 11:382) ( 17:010) ( 16:497) ( 11:773) ( 9:263)
GDP 0:041*** 0:031*** 0:019** 0:006  0:004
(3:684) (3:888) (2:400) (0:533) ( 0:321)
DEBT  0:047***  0:044***  0:044***  0:040***  0:043***
( 7:488) ( 9:703) ( 9:676) ( 6:427) ( 5:832)
PRIVCRED 0:111*** 0:137*** 0:148*** 0:150*** 0:217***
(3:783) (6:410) (6:937) (5:172) (6:278)
Notes   Dependent variable: Log of net reproduction rate. Bootstrapped Student's
t in parentheses. Temporal dummies included, country-specic xed eects partialled
out. Each column reports regression coecients for the given percentile of the depen-
dent variable's distribution. Statistical signicance asterisks: * = 10%, ** = 5%, ***
= 1%.
Appendix
A Comparative statics results
The case of no frictions
Let us consider the young adult optimization program under the assumption
of perfect nancial markets:
max
c1t ;nt;c
2
t+1;c
3
t+1;c
3
t+2
v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

sub (1  nt)w1t +
w2t+1
Rt+1
+
ntqt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
st
nt 1
+
 

c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0:
Optimization provides the rst-order conditions:
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@Lu
@c1t
=
@v
@c1t
  u = 0 (10)
@Lu
@nt
=  w1tu +
@v
@nt
+ u
qt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
= 0 (11)
@Lu
@c2t+1
=
@u
@c2t+1
  u
Rt+1
= 0 (12)
@Lu
@c3t+1
=
@u
@c3t+1
  u
Rt+1nt 1
= 0 (13)
@Lu
@c3t+2
=
@g
c3t+2
  u
Rt+1Rt+2
= 0 (14)
@Lu
@u
=(1  nt)w1t +
w2t+1
Rt+1
+
ntqt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
st
nt 1
+
 

c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0;
(15)
where u is the Lagrange multiplier. Let us consider the comparative statics
eect of life-cycle wages on fertility, (16):
dnt =
1

8>><>>:

@v
@c1t
22dw
1
t

| {z }
Cost of children
 

62 (1  nt) dw1t +
62
Rt+1
dw2t+1

| {z }
Income eect
9>>=>>; (16)
where  and ij denote the determinant and the (i; j)-th cofactor of the
bordered Hessian matrix of the problem, obtained deriving the rst order
conditions with regard to c1t , nt, c
2
t+1, c
3
t+1, c
3
t+2, and u. The second-order
conditions for utility maximization imply that  < 0 and 22 > 0. Hence,
the sign of the income eect depends on 62, whose expression is:
62 =  @
2g
@
 
c3t+2
2
"
@2u
@
 
c2t+1
2 @2u
@
 
c3t+1
2    @u@c2t+1@c3t+1
2#



@v
@c1t@nt
  w1t
@2v
@ (c1t )
2

  qt+2
Rt+1Rt+2

:
(17)
The strict concavity of the utility functions u() and g() implies that
the sign of 62 depends on the sign of the expression in brackets on the
second line of (17), which is made of the dierence of two terms. The one in
parentheses is positive when children are normal goods in the maximization of
v (c1t ; nt). The term qt+2 (Rt+1Rt+2)
 1 refers to the negative eect on fertility
of larger wealth because parents have more resources to fund their old-age
consumption. Hence, we detect three channels of inuence of income upon
fertility: two are negative, one is positive. The comparative-statics eect of
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the gift qt+2 on nt is given by:
dnt
dqt+2
=   
 1
Rt+1Rt+2

@v
@c1t
22 + nt62

: (18)
The change in the number of children due to a change in the interest rate,
assuming that Rt = Rt+1 = R, is given by
dnt
dR
=
1
R
8>><>>:
u
R

2qt+222
R
 32   42
nt 1
  252
R

| {z }
Substitution eect
+62

Dt   st+1
R

| {z }
Financial position
9>>=>>; :
Given the sign of the cofactor 62, the discussion of the eects of qt+2 and
R on nt follows along the lines of section (3.2).
The model with borrowing constraints
Under the assumption of binding borrowing constraints the utility maximiza-
tion program becomes:
max
c1t ;nt;c
2
t+1;c
3
t+1;c
3
t+2
v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

sub (a) (1  nt)w1t +
w2t+1
Rt+1
+
ntqt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
st
nt 1
+
 

c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0
(b) c1t = (1  nt)w1t +Dt;
By dierencing the rst order conditions, we obtain the comparative statics
eects of the exogenous variables on nt.
Higher credit availability will impact on household fertility according to
the following expression:
dnt
dDt
=
 11
 

w1t
@2v
@ (c1t )
2  
@v
@c1tnt

+
 51
 
; (19)
where   and  ij denote the determinant and the (i; j)-th cofactor of the
bordered Hessian matrix of the problem. In this case,   > 0 and  11 < 0 are
required for the maximization problem to reach an optimal solution, while it
can be easily veried that  51 > 0:
 51 =   qt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
"
@2u
@
 
c2t+1
2 @2u
@
 
c3t+1
2    @u@c2t+1@c3t+1
2#
@2g
@
 
c3t+2
2 > 0:
(20)
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The model with saving constraints
Now we analyze the model of household choice by assuming that the optimal
desired value of saving st+1 is higher than the ceiling st+1. Accordingly, the
maximization program becomes:
max
c1t ;nt;c
2
t+1;c
3
t+1;c
3
t+2
v
 
c1t ; nt

+ u
 
c2t+1; c
3
t+1

+ g
 
c3t+2

sub (a) (1  nt)w1t +
w2t+1
Rt+1
+
ntqt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
st
nt 1
 

c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
+
c3t+2
Rt+1Rt+2
+
c3t+1
nt 1Rt+1

= 0
(b) c3t+2 = Rt+2st + ntqt+2;
The reaction of a household's fertility to greater investment opportunities is
given by:
dnt
dst+1
=
1

 
52
Rt+1
  qt+2Rt+2 @
2g
@
 
c3t+2
222
!
: (21)
where  and ij denote the determinant and the (i; j)-th cofactor of the
bordered Hessian matrix of the problem. Among the second order conditions
for a maximum of the problem we have  > 0 and 22 < 0. In this expression,
the term
 qt+2Rt+2 @
2g
@
 
c3t+2
222 < 0
refers to the trade-o between the investment in children and that in nancial
activities. The sign of the term is negative because greater nancial invest-
ment opportunities reduce the need to raise children for old age consumption.
The other component of the eect of st+1 on nt has the opposite sign of the
income eect of wages, determined by the sign of 52. Below we show that
52 is negative:
52 =  
"
@2u
@
 
c2t+1
2 @2u
@
 
c3t+1
2    @u@c2t+1@c3t+1
2#
@v
@c1t@nt
  w1t
@2v
@ (c1t )
2

< 0:
(22)
Hence, fertility will decrease with st+1.
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